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Abstract 
In this paper we describe the main causes of recent financial crisis as a result of many theoretical, methodological, 
and practical shortcomings mostly according to heterodox, but also including some important orthodox 
economists. At the theoretical level, there are problems concerning teaching and using economic models with 
overly unrealistic assumptions. In the methodological front, we find the unsuspected shadow of Milton Friedman’s 
‘unrealisticism of assumptions’ thesis lurking behind the construction of this kind of models and the widespread 
neglect of methodological issues. Of course, the most evident shortcomings are at the practical level: (i) huge 
interests of the participants in the financial markets (banks, central bankers, regulators, rating agencies mortgage 
brokers, politicians, governments, executives, economists, etc. mainly in the US, Canada and Europe, but also in 
Japan and the rest of the world), (ii) in an almost completely free financial and economic market, that is, one 
(almost) without any regulation or supervision, (iii) decision-taking upon some not well regarded qualities, like 
irresponsibility, ignorance, and inertia; and (iv) difficulties to understand the current crisis as well as some biases 
directing economic rescues by governments. Following many others, we propose that we take this episode as an 
opportunity to reflect on, and hopefully redirect, economic theory and practice. 
 
 
Theorising in economics, I have argued, is an attempt at understanding and I now add that bad theorising is a 




The recent world financial crisis has been inducing lively debates on the current status 
of economic theory. In this paper we set out an outline of these debates. We can state the 
questions we are concerned with as follows: first, what were the infirmities of theories and 
empirical behaviour underlying most of the views of the policy-makers, regulators and market 
operators? To answer this question, we lean on a host of evaluations of “what went wrong” with 
mainstream models of financial markets, both by orthodox and heterodox economists. Yet, 
there are many reasons why formal modelling could be damaging, underlined mostly by 
heterodox economists. Thus, although there are some signs of theoretical ‘recantation’, most of 
the propositions and proponents of efficient markets and rational expectations hypotheses are 
unshaken, quite paradoxically, as could assert Minsky, because of the very prompt intervention 
of the State, broadly speaking, through expansionist monetary policy and Big Government 
action. 
Second, what are the methodological foundations of those mainstream models? We 
claim that a mix of methodological confusion and ontological neglect, often resting on a 
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prejudice towards methodologically-minded critiques, lend an unwarranted stamp of 
‘scientificity’ to mainstream theorizing practices (Dow, 2008). As a result, economists of all 
stripes are now urging for caution when dealing with models (Lawson, 2009). 
Even those who defend those models on basis similar to Churchill’s defence of 
democracy (“it is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried”) are 
now urging for attention to the content and truth value of economic theories. This situation 
provides an opportunity to revisit Friedman’s (1953) influential methodological essay and 
similar works. Whether arguing a case for or against Friedman’s theses, most methodologists 
find it a hard work to determine to which specific philosophical school it should belong (Mayer, 
1993; Mäki, 1986). However, the philosophical allegiances of Friedman’s essay is not our 
focus. Rather, we intend to show a lingering and unsuspected shadow of Friedman in all 
mainstream justification for its practices (Blaug, 2002, p. 30). Next, we point out the pitfalls of 
using ‘unrealistic assumptions’ in economic theories – a practice sanctioned by Friedman. 
Ironically, Friedman’s admonishments for testing assumptions by its predictive power remain in 
oblivion since he spelled them out. Economists pay lip-service to it, at best (Colander et al., 
2009). 
Since Friedman’s essay, economics has grown more and more formalistic. We claim, 
following Mongin (1987), Hands (2009) and Blaug (1997b, 2002, 2003), that whatever 
Friedman’s designs and caveats were (see Friedman, 1999), we can detect his influence in the 
overly formalistic methods of present-day economics. Primacy of formalism, by its turn, can 
give and, in fact, undoubtedly gives real support to the use of unrealistic assumptions (Lawson, 
2003, chap. 1 and 10; 2009), on grounds that resonates Friedman’s theses at every bit (e.g., 
Blinder, 1999; Marcet, 2010). The main results are: at the substantive level, one constructs 
economic theories in near complete disdain for real world problems and the ‘academic game’ is 
played almost only for its own sake. At the methodological level, economic theories are 
plagued with known falsehoods that hinder causal explanations. This is why mainstream 
economists have to retreat and sometimes recant their positions. We set out that lest we are 
trapped in another “unexpected event” like the recent financial crisis, a bolder turn in economic 
theorizing should be achieved. This transformation is already in progress, at least among some 
economists and schools of thought. Nevertheless, we think we could move faster by helping to 
promote those analyses and research programmes which make their methodological 
underpinnings clear and pay attention to the plainly important items of the institutional fabric of 
society (Lawson, 1997, pp. 157-198; 2003, pp. 28-62; Hodgson, 1998). 
 
2. An outline of the crisis 
 
An outline of institutional setting changes which would finally result in the “subprime 
crisis” of 2007/2008 started in the 1960s. It marks the growth of the importance of institutional 
investors in relation to deposit institutions (commercial banks) in the market for wealth and 
credit management, to which commercial banks reply with a series of financial innovations: 
conglomeration, underwriting, insurances, repurchase agreement, pension and investment 
funds, etc. In the 1980s there was “the removal of Regulation Q placing ceilings on interest 
rates on retail deposits” and in the 1990s “the elimination of the Glass-Steagall restrictions on 
mixing commercial and investment banking.”(Eichengreen, 2008, p. 2). In 1994, the Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act allowed the expansion of branches and 
interstate operations. In 1999, further liberalization permitted bank holding companies to have 
insurance companies and investment banks among other assets in their portfolio. In addition, in 
the 80’s, the rise of the decoupling between interests and maturities of assets and liabilities 
brought about increasing problems to the Saving & Loans institutions (S&Ls), causing a 
housing financing crisis in the US. As a consequence, there were major changes in 
securitization, which after 2002 would finally beget an extraordinary expansion in mortgage 
issues of various kinds, finally resulting in September 2008, after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, 
in the so-called subprime crisis.1 
A more detailed sketch of the last speculation cycle, however, could be presented like 
this: after the1970’s, there was a huge rise of the investments in the mortgage markets, for there 
were real guarantees backing those assets, improving national and also international assets to 
liabilities requirements, through better capital ratios, i.e., a bank’s capital related to its risk-
weighted assets, and also better balance sheets. Moreover, the process of housing and 
commercial mortgages securitization, that is, of mortgages creation and further securitization 
through selling generated huge receipts for those originators: 
Freddie Mac developed the first private mortgage-backed security for conventional mortgages, known as the PC 
(participation certificate); and the purpose was to buy mortgages from lenders and to pool them together and sell 
them as mortgage backed securities. Thus, the seed for linking the mortgage markets with the broader capital 
markets were planted in 1968 and 1970 with the restructuring of Fannie Mae and Ginnie Mae, and the 
establishment of Freddie Mac.(Colton, 2002, p. 9). 
 
Thus, in 1970 S&Ls responded for 47.7% of all mortgages creation, 60.6% in 1976, but 
in 1997 this share had been reduced to 17.8%, increasing to 20.7% in 2000. On the other hand, 
the share of commercial banks (CBs) and chiefly mortgage companies (MCs) went from 46.9% 
in 1970 (21.9% for CBs and 25% for MCs), 35.7% in 1976 (21.7% for CBs and 14% for MCs, 
the lowest percentage for MCs for the entire period 1970-2000), and 79.3% in 2000 (21.4% for 
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CBs and 57.9% for MCs; Colton, 2002, p. 35).That is to say, there is an oscillation of the share 
of CBs mortgage creation from 18.6% to 27.3% in the period 1970-2000, with the exception of 
1990 with 33.4%, and 1998 with 15.3%. More importantly, however, the MCs share has risen 
to an all time high of 61.1% in 1998, reduced to that still astonishing 57.9%, in 2000. In other 
words, the main mortgage generators changed from S&Ls in the 1970’s to MCs in the 1990’s, 
with CBs roughly maintaining their shares (Colton, 2002). Concomitantly, from 1970 to 2003 
the share in total mortgage stock of federal institutions and Government Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs), like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, departed from 8.1% to 42.9%, while the share of 
S&Ls went from 43.9% to 9.5%. Thus, private institutions held in their balance sheets only 
credits beyond the acquisition ceiling determined for the GSEs, i.e., the non-conforming loans 
or those assets whose risks implied an excessive discount to be sold (Cagnin, 2009a, pp. 262-3; 
Acharya & Richardson, 2009). Nevertheless, total issuance of new mortgages went from $36 
million in 1970, to $1.3 billion in 1998, $2.2 billion in 2001 ($190 million subprime or 8.6%, 
from which $95 million securitized or 50.4%), an all time high of $3.95 billion in 2003 ($335 
million subprime or 8.5%, from which $202 million securitized or 60.5%), $2,9 billion in 2004 
($540 million subprime or 18.5%, from which $401 million securitized or 74.3%), $3.1 billion 
in 2005 ($625 million subprime or 20%, from which $507 million securitized or 81.2%) and $3 
billion in 2006 ($600 million subprime or, again, 20%, from which $483 million securitized or 
80.5%; Wray, 2007, p. 30). Another important detail is that the relevance of the largest CBs in 
the origination of new mortgages, including subprime and Alt-A, and of those securities in the 
assets are disproportional in relation to the small banks (Graph 1). 
As we know, those ‘heterodox’ (subprime and Alt-A) assets have some important 
differences: Alt-A assets are those issued to borrowers which have not presented all the 
required documentation but that are ‘near-prime’ (Roubini, 2007) could be a prime borrower 
according to their borrowing records, while subprime borrowers are those who have at least one 
record showing default or relevant delay in payment of an instalment. Subprime borrowers 
present the records showed in Graphs 2 and 3 (take from Wray, pp. 32-33). 
Graph 1: Derivatives as a Percent of Assets, 1992–2008: 
Small (<$1 Billion in Assets) vs. Big (>$1 Billion in Assets) Banks 
 
Source: Dymski, 2010. 
 
In other words, subprime assets displayed quite worse records both for delinquency and 
foreclosure rates in the period 1998-2007. Notwithstanding, the originators from the 1990’s 
onward, CBs and predominantly MCs, as we showed above, baited potential subprime 
borrowers with teaser rate mortgages (Kregel, 2009, p. 660). 
Graph 2 – Comparisons of Prime vs Subprime Delinquency Rates, Total U.S. 1998-2007 
 
Graph 3 – Comparisons of Prime vs Subprime Foreclosure Rates, Total U.S. 1998-2007 
 
 
As Randall Wray points out: 
From 2004-2006 (when lending standards were loosest) 8.4 million adjustable rate mortgages were originated, 
worth $2.3 trillion; of those, 3.2 million (worth $1.05 trillion) had “teaser rates” that were below market and would 
reset in 2-3 years at higher rates.(...) Of the $1 trillion dollars of teaser rate mortgages, $431 billion had initial 
interest rates at or below 2%.(...) An example will help. A subprime hybrid adjustable rate mortgage on a $400,000 
house might have initial payments of about $2200 per month for interest-only at a rate of 6.5%. After a reset, the 
payments rise to $4000 per month at an interest rate of 12% plus principle (Wray 2007, p. 31). 
 
But why CBs and MBs, mainly, did this? Because they do not have to maintain these 
credits in their balance sheet, i.e., they bundled together a series of these assets – in fact more 
than a thousand – in a mortgage pool, divide this pool in tranches – generally called senior (for 
the best shares of these tranches), mezzanine (medium rated shares) and junior (riskiest shares 
of the tranches) and sold these tranches to the market (Volcker, 2008, pp. 104-7; Acharya & 
Richardson, 2009). They needed beforehand to rate the tranches through a credit rating agency 
(Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s, chiefly, but also others – White, 2009; Crotty & 
Epstein, 2009). James Galbraith (2010, pp. 8-9) explains the trick: 
The business model was no longer one of originating mortgages, holding them, and earning income as home 
owners paid off their debts; it was one of originating the mortgage, taking a fee, selling the mortgage to another 
entity, and taking another fee. To do that, the mortgages had to be packaged. They had to be sprinkled with the 
holy water of quantitative risk-management models. They had to be presented to ratings agencies and blessed and 
sanctified, at least in part, as triple-A, so that they could legally be acquired by pension funds and other fiduciaries, 
which have no obligation to do any due diligence beyond looking at the rating. Alchemy was the result: a great 
deal of lead was marketed as gold. I think it’s fair to say that if this sounds to you like a criminal enterprise, that’s 
because that’s exactly what it was. There was even a criminal language associated with it: liars’ loans, NINJA 
loans (no income, no job or assets) – it sounds funny, but in fact this is why the world financial system has melted 
down – neutron loans (loans that would explode, killing the people but leaving the buildings intact), toxic waste 
(that part of the securitized collateral debt obligation that would take the first loss). These are terms that are put 
together by people who know what they are doing, and anybody close to the industry was familiar with those 
terms. Again, there’s no innocent explanation. I would argue that what happened here was an initial act of theft by 
the originators of the mortgages; an act exactly equivalent to money laundering by the ratings agencies, which 
passed the bad securities through their process and relabeled them as good securities, literally leaving the 
documentation in the hands of the originators (the computer files and underlying documents were examined by the 
ratings agencies only very, very sporadically); and a fencing operation, or the passing of stolen goods, by the large 
banks and investment banks, which marketed them to the likes of IKB Deutsche Industriebank, the Royal Bank of 
Scotland, and, of course, pension funds and other investors across the world. The reward for being part of this was 
the extraordinary compensation of the banking sector... 
 
The originators maintained only a small part of these assets in their balance sheets 
(Volcker, 2010) or in Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) – enterprises whose only purpose 
were to issue asset-backed securities – because of difficulties to sell some tranches, prospective 
profitability of some assets or circumvention of Basel II and national regulations, since those 
assets remained off balance sheets, or even because of repurchase agreements. Thus, although 
CBs and MBs created quite risky assets, they did not remain with those assets, selling them to 
other investors and earning big fees for this ‘service’.2 That is to say, they become free of much 
of the own risk which their very entrepreneurial behaviour generated (Kregel, 2009, p. 659; 
Dymski, 2010), although they many times remained with shares of these more risky loans, 
usually the riskiest shares (Krugman & Wells, 2010). 
However, this is not the end of this unbelievable metamorphosis: some of the tranches, 
mostly the mezzanine ones, were recombined in new assets, rather paradoxically some of them 
received better rates than the original ones, even AAA, making possible their acquisition, in this 
last case, also by pension funds, mutual funds and agents less prone to risk.3 A Collateralized 
Debt Obligation (CDO) backed in those assets was then issued and also divided in tranches, 
hence making feasible the creation of brand new securities, with new risk and profitability 
ratings, etc., and so on, in a multilayer pyramid. These issues of CDOs grew exponentially from 
2002-2007, from $ 11.9 billion in 2000 to $108.8 billion in 2005, and then achieving their 
highest levels in 2006, with $186.7 billion, and 2007, with $177.6 billion (Torres Filho and 
Borça Jr., 2008, pp. 142-3). 
Finally, as the whole scheme is a mix of Ponzi finance, speculation on the profitability 
or at least the maintenance of one’s investment values, fraudulent action, overlook of 
regulators, authorities, etc. (Guttman, 2009; Galbraith, 2010), the majority of the agents, 
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debtors or creditors, needed, as always (Galbraith, 1954; Kindleberger, 1978), at least two 
factors happening together, with no interruption, in order to maintain that scheme: 
a) a continued and increasing entrance of capital, feeding a pyramid (Ponzi) scheme, 
that is to say, making possible not only to maintain but also to augment the prices of the assets 
which backed the securities. For, as we know, and as a logical conclusion of the scheme 
outlined yet in this paper, the prices – mainly of the mortgages, since this speculation was built 
up on housing and commercial mortgages – must rise in order to bring about the expected and 
desired profitability of the majority of the agents, making possible a continuous and even 
increasing inflow of capital to this market, with only minors non auspicious events, like minor 
crisis, bankruptcies, etc., quickly circumvented by the expert action of Central Banks (Federal 
Reserve, in the US case) and Big Government, as Minsky (1982, 1986) explained a long time 
ago. Furthermore, the continuous rise in the prices of the assets, in spite of these minor 
upsetting events, seemed to corroborate almost all the market expectations as well as the 
algorithms used to calculate and distribute risks according to historical (which?) data (Zendron, 
2006; Colander et al., 2009; Dow, 2008; Davidson, 1982-3; Minsky, 1982), and also yields, 
subdivide tranches, etc. Of course, the entire scheme would collapse if prices stopped to rise. In 
addition, houses are the main assets for many families and, thus, several of these families used 
those assets with rising values to increase their borrowings through renewed mortgages, 
piggybacks, etc. (Goodhart & Hoffmann, 2008; Goodhart et al., 2009). 
Graph 4 – Residential Prices in the US – 1992-2008 (variation in relation to the same quarter of the previous year) 
 
Source: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, apud Cagnin, 2009a, p. 269; 2009b, p. 161. 
 
Thus, there was an almost continuous rise of the prices of housings in the US, from 1992 
to the middle of 2005 (Cagnin, 2009a, p. 269; 2009b, p. 161). From this moment, which almost 
exactly coincides with the acme of housing selling in the US that occurred in the fourth quarter 
of 2005, with 8.5 million houses sold (1.3 million new), those prices and selling started a 
uninterrupted decrease. In the third quarter of 2008, the housing selling had achieved only 5.4 
million units (a 36.5% reduction in less than three years), with 0.5 million new (an astonishing 
61.5% decrease in the same period; Torres Filho and Borça Jr. 2008, pp. 144-5). 
b) a benign action, in a Minskian sense, of monetary authorities, keeping low interests 
rates in the entire period (Cagnin, 2009b, 160-1). As a matter of fact, many orthodox 
economists will blame these policies for the crisis, together with supposed naive and 
misconceived policies directed to guarantee at least a house for each American family, despite 
their income level (Taylor, 2009; Gjerstad and Smith, 2009; Patnaik, 2010; Krugman and 
Wells, 2010). In any case, probably the majority of the economics establishment, whatever their 
explicit or implicit theoretical strand, will agree that low interest rates, by the Federal Reserve, 
fed the housing and housing prices boom, although some could consider an impossible mission 
to attain all the goals attributed by the mainstream to the same monetary policy: low inflation 
rates, full employment, mild asset speculation, etc. (Greenspan, 2007). Moreover, as also 
explained by Minsky (1982), any more or less radical change in this benign monetary policy 
would imply simultaneously in changes in current and prospective prices of all the assets, 
disturbing the upswing and certainly bringing about pressures for reversion of policies and/or 
blames for the premature explosion of the speculation bubble. 
 
2.1. The onset of the crisis 
 
The crisis began with the reversion of the growth of the prices of the housings, which 
started to fall as we have seen in the middle of 2005. As we explained a stabilisation of the 
housing prices would damage all the pyramid scheme, which had as a sine qua non a steady rise 
in the prices. Thus, a reversion would be even more harmful, increasing losses and difficulties 
to service or even to roll over debts (Minsky, 1982). Moreover, American laws allowed 
mortgage debtors to abandon (‘walk away’) their residences, i.e., to transfer them to the 
creditors if they want to retrench from paying their mortgages, what started to be done with the 
fall on the residences prices. In addition, as we have seen in Graphs 2 and 3, the delinquency 
and foreclosure rates of subprime debtors were excessive large compared to those of prime 
debtors. There was an important reduction therefore in the yields of the SIVs, with their main 
owners, commercial and investment banks, having to cover payment delays, losses, etc., and 
not least, requiring those banks to record those losses in their balance sheets, what had not been 
done beforehand. Of course, there were enormous costs also to several tranches of CDOs. 
Therefore, it became then clear that the balance sheets of many financial intermediaries, 
even of some of the largest banks in the US and Europe could not be trusted, because of the 
absence of knowledge on the share of toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions 
(Dymski, 2010; Galbraith, 2010, Einchengreen et al., 2009; Kregel, 2009). Creditors began to 
withdraw their investments in SIVs, mutual funds, etc., in the usual ‘flight to quality’, i.e., to 
US Treasuries, rising rapidly the spreads between the rates needed to attract investors and the 
FED Funds (Eichengreen et al., 2009; Torres-Filho and Borça Jr., 2008). Consequently, there 
was a retrenchment of creditors from financial institutions, of financial institutions from 
borrowers, and so on, in a known vicious cycle which simultaneously diminished credits and 
rose interests (Minsky, 1982), including interbank loans, feeding back the decline in house 
prices and investments, and even turning impossible the pricing of mortgage backed securities. 
That is the reason for the first strong signs of the coming crisis: the bankruptcy of Ownit 
Solutions crisis, a nonbank specialist in subprime and Alt-A mortgages, in 2006, the August 9, 
2007 halting of withdrawals from three investment funds by BNP Paribas, with about $2.2 
billion in total assets, after Bear Sterns, on July 31, and Union Investment Management GmbH, 
on August 3, have recurred to the same measures, a week before (Boyd, 2007; Acharya & 
Richardson, 2009, p. 208). The markets were then disturbed, but almost returned to ‘business as 
usual’, until the need of Bear Sterns to be sold to J.P. Morgan, on the weekend of 15-16 March, 
2008, in a rush to avoid a financial panic before of the opening of the markets in Asia, on 
Monday. Bear Sterns was sold with a special financing from the FED to fund up to $30 billion 
of Bear Sterns’ less liquid assets. And all this was needed despite a startling 93% price discount 
to of that investment bank closing stock price on the New York Stock Exchange, on Friday 14 
March or 99% considering those prices a year before (Sorkin & Thomas Jr., 2008). Until the 
much known policy mistake with Lehman Brothers, on the weekend of 12-15 September of that 
same year (Lavoie, 2010, pp. 5-6; Taylor, 2010, pp. 360-1) and the decision of the US Treasury, 
just on 16 September to loan $85 billion to AIG in exchange for a stake of almost 80% in that 
Group, in order to prevent its bankruptcy (Wessel, 2009). Wachovia (-73.2%), Wells-Fargo (-
65.5%), Citigroup (-41.2%), J.P. Morgan (-25.5%) and Bank of America (-19.2%) assets also 
faced huge losses in their August 2008 market prices in comparison to July 2007 (Torres-Filho 
and Borça Jr., 2008; Guttman, 2009). As Crotty (2009, p. 567) affirmed, “[i]t is estimated that 
by February 2009, almost half of all the CDOs ever issued had defaulted... Defaults led to a 
32% drop in the value of triple A rated CDOs composed of super-safe senior tranches and a 
95% loss on triple A rated CDOs composed of mezzanine tranches...”. 
 
3. Reliance on fragile theoretical foundations 
 
One important issue in contention is the methodological underpinnings supporting (or 
not) one’s personal view (or even a scientific group’s – Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970) view, of 
financial markets and the analyses and proposals which are derived of those views (Laidler, 
2010). We will divide this discussion in two major parts, presented in this item – analysis of 
financial markets and of the current economic crisis – and in the next – view (or understanding) 
of economics and financial markets and broad considerations on methodological issues. That is 
to say, we will not discuss in this paper proposals for the current crisis, although they could be 
considered a rather logical consequence of our paper. For this would require practically another 
paper. 
We can follow the outline sketched by Krugman and Wells (2010) to present the 
arguments of several economists on the crisis. They divide their explanation in four major 
issues, nor mutually exclusives: a) the low interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve after the 
2001 recession; b) the global savings glut; c) financial innovations that disguised risk; and d) 
government programs that created moral hazard. 
 
a) The low interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve after the 2001 recession 
 
A large stream of economists contend that too low interest rates, from at least 2002 to 
2006 are the main or even the unique responsible for the crisis. As Krugman and Wells (2010) 
explain, after the burst of technology bubble of the late 1990s, central banks cut base short-term 
interest rates, which are under their direct control, in an attempt to avert a slump. The Federal 
Reserve cut its overnight from 6.5 percent at the beginning of 2000 to 1 percent in 2003, 
keeping the rate at this low point until the beginning of the summer of 2004. 
Graph 5 – Federal Funds Rate, Actual and Counterfactual (in %), U.S. 2000-2007 
 
Apud: Taylor (2010, p. 342). 
As Taylor (2010) proposes, Graph 5 would show that the actual monetary policy in the 
U.S. was excessively expansionist, not following the Taylor rule which “worked well during the 
historical experience of the ‘Great Moderation’ that began in the early 1980s.(...) This was an 
unusually big deviation from the Taylor rule. There has been no greater or more persistent 
deviation of actual Fed policy since the turbulent days of the 1970s. So there is clearly evidence 
of monetary excesses during the period leading up to the housing boom.”(Taylor, 2010, pp. 
342-3). He also provides “statistical evidence” that that “interest-rate deviation could plausibly 
bring about a housing boom.... In this way, an empirical proof was provided that monetary 
policy was a key cause of the boom and hence the bust and the crisis.”(Taylor, 2010, p. 344). 
Inflation rates, measured through CPI inflation, would also have been lower, around the 2% 
target suggested by many policy-makers – of course, adept of inflation-target policies – instead 
of the 3.2% during the past five years. Moreover, “housing was also a volatile part of GDP in 
the 1970s, a period of monetary instability before the onset of the Great Moderation. The 
monetary policy followed during the Great Moderation had the advantages of keeping both the 
overall economy stable and the inflation rate low.”(Taylor, 2010, p. 345). 
In addition, interest rates in several European – strongly influenced by the American 
monetary policies countries – were also below what historical regularities according to the 
Taylor rule would have predicted. And the housing booms would have been the largest where 
this deviation was the largest. However, as he candidly asserts, “One can challenge this 
conclusion, of course, by challenging the model, but an advantage of using a model and an 
empirical counterfactual is that one has a formal framework for debating the issue.”(Taylor, 
2010, p. 345). Also, according to the subjacent efficient market model of his analysis (Laidler, 
2010, p. 59), the rating agents would have underestimated the securities risks “either because of 
a lack of competition, poor accountability or, most likely, an inherent difficulty in assessing risk 
owing to the complexity”.(Taylor, 2010, p. 350). Finally, the behaviour of GSEs, like Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, encouraged to expand and to buy Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), 
“should be added to the list of government interventions that were part of the problem.”(Taylor, 
2010, p. 351). Consequently, according to Taylor, the major problem after the crisis was one of 
risk rather than liquidity, made worse also by wrong policies which engendered Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy, for they made unpredictable which financial institutions government will 
save and support. 
As a conclusion, “government actions and interventions caused, prolonged, and 
worsened the financial crisis. They caused it by deviating from historical precedents and 
principles for setting interest rates that had worked well for twenty years. They prolonged it by 
misdiagnosing the problems in the bank credit markets and thereby responding inappropriately 
by focusing on liquidity rather than risk. They made it worse by providing support for certain 
financial institutions and their creditors but not others in an ad hoc fashion, without a clear and 
understandable framework. While other factors were certainly at play, these government actions 
should be first on the list of answers to the question of what went wrong.”(Taylor (2010, p. 
362). Certainly this is not only Taylor’s opinion. Many economists share his view (Krugman & 
Wells, 2010, Patnaik, 2010, Cassidy, 2010; Wickens, 2009). 
However, as Krugman and Wells (2010) explain, there are 
some serious problems with this view. For one thing, there were good reasons for the Fed to keep its overnight, or 
“policy,” rate low. Although the 2001 recession wasn’t especially deep, recovery was very slow—in the United 
States, employment didn’t recover to pre-recession levels until 2005. And with inflation hitting a thirty-five-year 
low, a deflationary trap, in which a depressed economy leads to falling wages and prices, which in turn further 
depress the economy, was a real concern. It’s hard to see, even in retrospect, how the Fed could have justified not 
keeping rates low for an extended period. 
The fact that the housing bubble was a North Atlantic rather than purely American phenomenon also makes it hard 
to place primary blame for that bubble on interest rate policy. The European Central Bank wasn’t nearly as 
aggressive as the Fed, reducing the interest rates it controlled only half as much as its American counterpart; yet 
Europe’s housing bubbles were fully comparable in scale to that in the United States. 
These considerations suggest that it would be wrong to attribute the real estate bubble wholly, or even in large part, 
to misguided monetary policy. 
 
b) the global savings glut 
 
According to some economists (Eichengreen, 2008) the global savings glut is a major 
cause for the crisis: 
The other element helping to set the stage for the crisis was the rise of China and the decline of investment in Asia 
following the 1997-8 crisis. With China saving nearly 50 per cent of its GNP, all that money had to go somewhere. 
Much of it went into U.S. treasuries and the obligations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This propped up the 
dollar. It reduced the cost of borrowing for Americans, on some estimates, by as much as 100 basis points, 
encouraging them to live beyond their means. It created a more buoyant market for Freddie and Fannie and for 
financial institutions creating close substitutes for their agency securities, feeding the originate and-distribute 
machine. 
Again, these were not exactly policy mistakes. Lifting a billion Chinese out of poverty is arguably the single most 
important event of our lifetimes, and it is widely argued that the policy strategy in which China exported 
manufactures in return for high-quality financial assets was a singularly successful growth recipe. Similarly, the 
fact that the Fed responded quickly to the collapse of the high-tech bubble prevented the 2001 recession from 
becoming even worse. But there were unintended consequences. Those adverse consequences were aggravated by 
the failure of regulators to tighten capital and lending standards when capital inflows combined with loose Fed 
policies to ignite a credit boom. They were aggravated by the failure of China to move more quickly to encourage 
higher domestic spending commensurate with its higher incomes.(Eichengreen, 2008, p. 4). 
 
The main idea supporting it is that the savings of countries like Germany and many 
Asian are used to buy securities in deficit nations, like the US, UK, Spain and so on: 
Historically, developing countries have run trade deficits with advanced countries as they buy machinery and other 
capital goods in order to raise their level of economic development. In the wake of the financial crisis that struck 
Asia in 1997–1998, this usual practice was turned on its head: developing economies in Asia and the Middle East 
ran large trade surpluses with advanced countries in order to accumulate large hoards of foreign assets as insurance 
against another financial crisis.(Krugman & Wells, 2010). 
 
An important problem with this explanation is that Central Banks throughout the world 
set the basic rates. Nonetheless,  
These capital inflows also drove down interest rates—not the short-term rates set by central bank policy, but 
longer-term rates, which are the ones that matter for spending and for housing prices and are set by the bond 
markets. In both the United States and the European nations, long-term interest rates fell dramatically after 2000, 
and remained low even as the Federal Reserve began raising its short-term policy rate. At the time, Alan 
Greenspan called this divergence the bond market “conundrum,” but it’s perfectly comprehensible given the 
international forces at work. And it’s worth noting that while, as we’ve said, the European Central Bank wasn’t 
nearly as aggressive as the Fed about cutting short-term rates, long-term rates fell as much or more in Spain and 
Ireland as in the United States—a fact that further undercuts the idea that excessively loose monetary policy caused 
the housing bubble.(...) the global glut story provides one of the best explanations of how so many nations 
managed to get into such similar trouble.(Krugman & Wells, 2010). 
 
We can agree with Krugman and Wells if the savings are understood as influencing long 
term interest rates, i.e., if they are used to buy and make possible lower long term interest rates 
for these securities. Of course, to this savings we must add, at least for some individuals and 
groups, US, UK, Spain, etc., private savings. That is to say, the issue is not so much of a 
savings glut – for the sum of private, public and private savings in every country amounts to 
zero (Godley & Zezza, 2006; Godley et. al., 2007; 2008) – but one of where to put the financial 
resources to those who own them. 
 
c) financial innovations that disguised risk 
 
Many authors consider that several models which packed together many mortgage debts 
with other debts – even student loans, leveraged loans, credit card debts, corporate bonds, etc. 
(Acharya & Richardson, 2009, p. 199; Wallison, 2009b) – were the main responsible for the 
crisis, for they disguised the implicit risks of the many assets included in each CDO. As many 
analysts assert, it is simply impossible to rate risks in these CDOs and also, consequently, to 
know the entire situation of the financial institutions and of the whole financial system, even by 
the most savant. 
Banks and some other financial institutions acted then chiefly as originators of credit, 
i.e., as intermediaries (Kregel, 2009), usually not keeping them in their balance sheets. This 
behaviour was one of the responsible for the crisis, since those originators were not worried 
about real conditions of debtors, but mainly with creating new mortgages, in order to package 
them in CDOs and then sell them to the market, generating substantial fees for the originators 
(Stiglitz, 2009; Krugman & Wells, 2010). 
Moreover, systemic risks were disregarded in the models used by financial institutions 
(Zendron, 2006; Colander et al., 2009; Crotty, 2009). This turned risks invisible to agents, 
considered individually or systemically. We would add to these disguised risks the failure of 
rating agencies to rate more correctly those CDOs, in spite of the inherent difficulties or even 
impossibilities we stressed before for such rating. Nonetheless, the rating agencies mostly rated 
these packaged securities with very good ratings, normally with an AAA. This behaviour 
denotes a conflict of interests, for the rating agencies were regularly paid for these ratings, 
having interests to remain as good raters for the credit originators, in order to receive those 
payments regularly (Stiglitz, 2009; White, 2009). 
Furthermore, there were also conflicts of interests within the staff of the financial 
institutions, for their components received earnings based on profits also generated through fees 
paid for mortgages and other debts originations. In addition, it was quite possible that if a 
financial institution would face problems in the future those would not happen at the time the 
then members of the staff would be in those institutions. Besides, even those members could 
believe that the financial models to calculate risks were trustable and so even they could find 
out that they were doing a fair and good job for all. 
Regulators also believed somehow in market efficiency and those who had doubts about 
it were stifled by the “true believers.” In addition to that ideological issue, there were practical 
incentives like Wall Street (and other financial centres) political and ideological pressure – 
since many central bankers, secretaries and other regulators are connected to the financial 
institutions to be regulated or can work for them in the future (Crotty, 2009, p. 577). Finally, 
Wall Street and other financial centres are very important financial contributors to increasingly 
more expensive political campaigns.4 To sum up, all the incentives structure of the financial 
markets was flawed (Stiglitz, 2009; Wray, 2009). 
Everyone ignored both the risks posed by a general housing bust and the degradation of underwriting standards as 
the bubble inflated (that ignorance was no doubt assisted by the huge amounts of money being made). When the 
bust came, much of that AAA paper turned out to be worth just pennies on the dollar.(...) [However,] Three points 
seem relevant. First, the usual version of the story conveys the impression that Wall Street had no incentive to 
worry about the risks of subprime lending, because it was able to unload the toxic waste on unsuspecting investors 
throughout the world. But this claim appears to be mostly although not entirely wrong: while there were plenty of 
naive investors buying complex securities without understanding the risks, the Wall Street firms issuing these 
securities kept the riskiest assets on their own books. In addition, many of the somewhat less risky assets were 
bought by other financial institutions, normally considered sophisticated investors, not the general public. The 
overall effect was to concentrate risks in the banking system, not pawn them off on others. 
Second, the comparison between Europe and America is instructive. Europe managed to inflate giant housing 
bubbles without turning to American-style complex financial schemes. Spanish banks, in particular, hugely 
expanded credit; they did so by selling claims on their loans to foreign investors, but these claims were 
straightforward, “plain vanilla” contracts that left ultimate liability with the original lenders, the Spanish banks 
themselves. The relative simplicity of their financial techniques didn’t prevent a huge bubble and bust. 
A third strike against the argument that complex finance played an essential role is the fact that the housing bubble 
was matched by a simultaneous bubble in commercial real estate, which continued to be financed primarily by old-
fashioned bank lending. So exotic finance wasn’t a necessary condition for runaway lending, even in the United 
States.(Krugman & Wells, 2010). 
 
In conclusion,  
 
What is arguable is that financial innovation made the effects of the housing bust more pervasive: instead of 
remaining a geographically concentrated crisis, in which only local lenders were put at risk, the complexity of the 
financial structure spread the bust to financial institutions around the world.(Krugman & Wells, 2010). 
 
d) government programs that created moral hazard 
 
As Stiglitz (2009) shows, conservative critics point to the government as the principal 
culprit for the crisis. For the creation of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) required that 
banks lent a certain share of their portfolio to underserved minority communities (Wallison, 
2009a; Patnaik, 2010). They also blame GSEs, like Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae, which played 
a very large role in mortgage markets, despite their privatisation in 1968. 
Nevertheless, as Stiglitz (2009, p. 337) underscores,  
A recent Fed study showed that the default rate among CRA mortgagors is actually below average.... The problems 
in America’s mortgage markets began with the subprime market, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac primarily 
financed ‘conforming’ (prime) mortgages.(...) To be sure, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did get into the high-risk 
high leverage “games” that were the fad in the private sector, though rather late, and rather ineptly. Here, too, there 
was regulatory failure; the government-sponsored enterprises have a special regulator which should have 
constrained them, but evidently, amidst the deregulatory philosophy of the Bush Administration, did not. Once 
they entered the game, they had an advantage, because they could borrow somewhat more cheaply because of their 
(ambiguous at the time) government guarantee. They could arbitrage that guarantee to generate bonuses 
comparable to those that they saw were being “earned” by their counterparts in the fully private sector. 
                                                 
4 “[M]ost elected officials responsible for overseeing US financial markets have been strongly influenced by 
efficient market ideology and corrupted by campaign contributions and other emoluments lavished on them by 
financial corporations. Between 1998 and 2008, the financial sector spent $1.7 billion in federal election campaign 
contributions and $3.4 billion to lobby federal officials... Moreover, powerful appointed officials in the Treasury 
Department, the SEC, the Federal Reserve System and other agencies responsible for financial market oversight 
are often former employees of large financial institutions Who return to their firms or lobby for them after their 
time in office ends. Their material interests are best served by letting financial corporations do as they please in a 
lightly regulated environment. We have, in the main, appointed foxes to guard our financial chickens.”(Crotty, 
2009, p. 577). 
 
Krugman and Wells add the much known political motivation for this economic 
“analysis”. Those authors are 
careful not to name names and attributes the blame to generic “politicians,” it is clear that Democrats are largely to 
blame in his worldview. By and large, those claiming that the government has been responsible tend to focus their 
ire on Bill Clinton and Barney Frank, who were allegedly behind the big push to make loans to the poor.(...) The 
huge growth in the subprime market was primarily underwritten not by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac but by 
private mortgage lenders like Countrywide. Moreover, the Community Reinvestment Act long predates the 
housing bubble…. Overblown claims that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac single-handedly caused the subprime crisis 
are just plain wrong.  
As others have pointed out, Fannie and Freddie actually accounted for a sharply reduced share of the home lending 
market as a whole during the peak years of the bubble. To the extent that they did purchase dubious home loans, 
they were in pursuit of profit, not social objectives – in effect, they were trying to catch up with private lenders. 
Meanwhile, few of the institutions engaged in subprime lending... were commercial banks subject to the 
Community Reinvestment Act.  
Beyond that, there were the other bubbles – the bubble in US commercial real estate, which wasn’t promoted by 
public policy at all, and the bubbles in Europe. The fact that US residential housing was just part of a much larger 
phenomenon would seem to be presumptive evidence against any view that relies heavily on supposed distortions 
created by US politicians. 
Was government policy entirely innocent? No... Fannie and Freddie shouldn’t have been allowed to go chasing 
profits in the late stages of the housing bubble; and regulators failed to use the authority they had to stop excessive 
risk-taking.(Krugman & Wells, 2010). 
 
 
4. Considering methodological issues 
 
In this section we sketch a conception of what are the fundamental, metatheoretical 
failures involved in, and explaining, the theoretical problems of economics. In our view, the 
main problem (formalism) allows the use of very inappropriate models to understand economic 
reality. Moreover, since formalism presupposes an ontology of ‘closed systems’ it is unable to 
avoid economic disasters caused by phenomena of ‘open systems’, like uncertainty, bounded 
rationality, herd psychology, etc. Our interest is not primarily in debates within economic 
methodology, but in using methodological critiques of economic theory in order to see if we 
can learn to from this episode how can we profit from paying attention to the real word when 
designing models. We do so in three steps: outlining the critical realist approach to economic 
methodology, which draws attention to the ontology of economic world; discussing formalism 
and the problems concerning design and use of overly unrealistic models; and finally proposing 
some ways to proceed. 
 
4.1. The critical realist conception of scientific explanation 
 
Critical realism is a comparatively new and expanding approach to the methodology of 
economics. Proposed by the British philosopher of science Roy Bhaskar (1975, 1979), it was 
introduced in economics by a group of economists and other social scientists mostly associated 
with the University of Cambridge. It has made an appeal to philosophically-oriented economists 
and schools, like Post Keynesians and Austrians. The best known name of critical realist 
economic methodology is Tony Lawson (1997, 2003, and several papers), formerly editor of 
Cambridge Journal of Economics. Closely associated are Sheila Dow (2002, 2003), who writes 
extensively on macroeconomic theory and economic methodology, and the (old) institutionalist 
and evolutionary economic theorist Geoffrey Hodgson (2004, 2006). The pivotal theme within 
critical realism is the nature of scientific activity and explanation. 
According to that approach, traditional issues in economic methodology (logical 
empiricism and Popperian falsificationism) mistake the nature of scientific activity and so 
propose an misleading aim to (natural as well as social) working scientist. Let us briefly 
elaborate. In the natural sciences, theories are law-like statements from which implications are 
deduced and that ‘explains’ the object of interest. Thus, for example, an explanation of falling 
bodies is a deduction from Galileo’s Law plus a series of auxiliary or attending or 
simplifying/idealizing statements (e.g. perfect vacuum, flat surface of earth, etc.) According to 
the traditional methodology, explanation is subsuming a case of falling body into at least one 
general law. Prediction, on the other side, is to expect that from the same cause (a general law) 
the same effect will always (deterministically or probabilistically) ensue. Explanation and 
deduction are symmetrical (the famous Hempel-Oppenheim’s ‘symmetry thesis’). The 
empirical test of theories is at the same time condition for its acceptance, and a sign of growth 
of knowledge5. To prescribe this methodology for economics involves two implications: (i) 
there is only one valid method of inquiry all over the sciences (‘methodological monism’); and 
(ii) the search for regularities or constant conjunctions of events is the only possible mean of 
attaining knowledge (‘epistemic fallacy’). 
Starting from the latter, for critical realists constant conjunctions of events are neither 
necessary nor sufficient condition to claiming scientific knowledge. Scientific law-like 
statements are formulated in experimental (i.e. controlled) settings (‘closed systems), where 
constant conjunction of events obtains because one causal factor of interest is sealed off from 
any other countervailing factors that bear on the phenomenon of interest, such that we can 
always say ‘whenever (event type) X, then (event type) Y’. If valid, these statements will be 
successfully applied also in the nature (an ‘open system’). How is that possible? Traditional 
methodologists have a problem here: if stable conjunction of events are sought after, they are 
rather rarely spontaneously founded (astronomical laws, one of Lawson’s favorite example of 
spontaneous regularity, is indeed obtained under conditions of closure, see Mäki, 1992b, p. 
186); if, on the other hand, the subject matter of scientific investigation is explained by the 
                                                 
5 We will not delve into the details and the historical crumbling of ‘received’ (i.e., logical empiricist) and 
Popperian views of methodology, but see Hands (2001, chap. 3). It does not prevents Blaug (1997a, p. xxiii), an 
important supporter of Popperian ideas in economic methodology, of saying that ‘the Methodology which best 
supports the economist’s striving for substantive knowledge of economic relationships is the philosophy of science 
associated with the names of Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos. To full attain the ideal of falsifiability is, I still 
believe, the prime desideratum in economics.’ 
scientist’s intervention, then they are bound to admit that there is no genuine laws in the nature. 
Critical realists solve this problem by claiming that the aim of experimental activity is to isolate 
a putative factor causal from all others bearing on the phenomenon of interest. When the theory 
obtained is successfully applied in open systems is because scientists have identified correctly 
the causal (i.e., dominant) factor. This picture has important implications for critical realist’s 
account of science. 
Firstly, science should not be seen as the search for constant conjunction of events. The 
prime interest of critical realists is in ontology. Ontology is the study of the nature of world and 
what there is in it (its ‘ontic furniture’). Critical realists advance a series of ontological 
propositions. Reality is structured in layers, each of them more encompassing and deep from 
top-down. The first layer is the empirical domain (our sensory perception of events and state of 
affairs), the second one is the actual domain (things ‘as they really are’, irrespective to our 
knowing of or feeling them) and the third one is the real or deep domain, populated by 
structures, mechanisms, powers and tendencies that shape and condition the events of actual 
domain. Structures are the properties of an object of inquiry, its mode of being. Mechanisms are 
the way an object operates, due to its structure. Powers are capacities of the object, what it can 
cause when its mechanisms are trigged. Yet these mechanisms do not operate in isolation, but 
in open systems, such that many other mechanisms (enhancing or countervailing) might 
typically be at work simultaneously – thus concealing the mechanism we are interested in. That 
is why critical realists claim that mechanisms operate as tendencies, i.e., when trigged, a 
mechanism will necessarily operate, no matter what events ensue. In this ontological 
commitment, reality is stratified (in layers) and structured (any layer may be out of phase from 
each other), but an explanation is the move from the empirical domain into even deeper layers 
of reality, searching for the causal mechanisms of what exists in the actual domain and which 
we perceive in the empirical domain6. 
Secondly, due to this account of explanation, it does not require strict regularities. A 
unique event can be explained if we have sufficient information on its structure, and antecedent 
knowledge from where to start the research. Constant conjunctions of events are insufficient for 
explanations, too. For explaining a phenomenon is studying its structure looking for plausible 
mechanisms causally responsible for its occurrence, rather than simply recording correlations 
between empirical events. In fact critical realists charge positivists of all stripes of what they 
call ‘epistemic fallacy’ – mistakenly conflate ontological questions to epistemic questions. For 
example, the restlessness search for models that better ‘fit’ facts to a theory is a case in point, 
                                                 
6 That is only a sketchy picture of critical realist account of scientific practices. See a lengthy and sophisticated 
discussion of these matters in Lawson (1997, chap. 3). 
insofar as it reduces all phenomena to some measurable and all-compassing analytical 
categories referring only to empirical events. 
At last, thirdly, social scientific research can be done along lines broadly similar to 
natural science. The structures, mechanisms, etc. are obviously different, but the aim is equal: 
unearth causal mechanisms, powers and tendencies of structured objects of knowledge. From 
this point Lawson (1997, chap. 14 to 16 and 2003, chap. 2) elaborates the nature of social 
reality at length. It is characterized by internal (constitutive) and external (contingent) social 
relations, mediated by positions (hierarchies) and rules (norms, mores, conventions, etc.) 
Society is thus an unbroken net of relations, dependent of individual action but irreducible to it, 
with mechanisms and powers of its own. It constrains the alternative courses of action for 
individual decision, but does not determine the action actually chosen. Moreover, in at any time 
individual action is simultaneously reproducing and transforming society. Critical realists like 
Archer (1995, chap. 5) and Fleetwood (1995, pp. 86-90) call this process ‘the transformational 
model of social activity’: in society our actions are always based on structures inherited from 
the past and always transforming or reproducing this same structure for the future. That is why 
Lawson (2009, p. 764) claims that social processes are ‘a totality in motion’. 
One last question is: how can one obtain knowledge of these hidden structures? Critical 
realism is not a disguised form of outdated essentialism? That is where critical realists claim 
their position as falibilism – there is no guarantee for putative mechanisms besides its power to 
illuminate some reality (natural or social). On the problem of discriminate among alternative 
theories (the old problem of ‘identification’) is to be solved by the degree in which each theory 
can explain more (and in a better way) events than its competitors. Of course, this is a very 
hotly debated issue in the philosophy of science, opening the doors for relativism. Critical 
realists call in their help two notions: knowledge, as a social product is itself a ‘produced mean 
of production’ of knowledge, such that in the start of any research we have at least one theory 
to proceed. Moreover, the ontological commitment (‘how reality is’) traces a divide between 
knowledge of reality and its object. This make possible to be falibilist, not relativist: reality is 
the contrastive backdrop onto all scientific claims can be evaluated and our prior (scientific) 
beliefs revised. Thus, critical realists can (and relativists cannot) differentiate changes in the 
world from changes in knowledge. When we perceive some event (supposedly) disjunctive to 
our existing knowledge, we can abducing a mechanism (i.e., propose a cause for that effect) and 
investigate its occurrence. We shall deal with the question of how identify a causal mechanism 
shortly. Before that, we deal with the problem of formalism in economics and its (supposed) 
culpability for the crisis. 
 
4.2. Formalism and economic models 
 
In the wake of global financial crisis of 2008 is oftentimes found opinions to the effect 
that economic theory was made irrelevant due to its formalism. In the simply and plain words 
of Blaug: “what characterizes “formalism” is that technicalities are prized as ends in 
themselves, such that theories which do not lend themselves to technical treatment are set aside 
and with them the problems they address. Formalism is the worship of technique and that is 
what is wrong with it.”(Blaug 2002, p. 36) In fact, several critics and supporters of mainstream 
economics have made pronouncements on this regard. Of course, not all mainstream 
economists recognize a problem in the way of doing economics. They typically blame some 
factor exogenous to the discipline (regulatory shortcomings, excessively lax monetary policy, 
irrational optimism and pessimism, and so on) for the financial crisis.7 Others think that is just 
business as usual. Note, for example, LSE professor Marcet: 
What do economists do? We think economics as a science… [That means] if you don’t have a model, data is a 
mess… We need models just to see where to look. I should teach to our MSc students and undergraduate students 
theories (with internal consistency) that the research community has thoroughly and very strongly tested in 
empirical terms, because that’s our job. Necessarily, economic models are oversimplified [there follows the 
Galileo’s Law as an example] and thus, in order a model to be a model, is the easiest thing in the world to make of 
economic theories… But, unless I find better models, isn’t fair to make fun.(Marcet, 2010; our transcription). 
 
Yet Alan Blinder, when praised the progress of economics, has recognized the problem: 
Economics was off to the mathematical races. Intellectual giants like Samuelson and Arrow led the way, sweeping 
away the old, more literary tradition in economics and attracting a small army of scholars with a more scientific 
bent.’ And he adds: “But somewhere along the way the warm embrace of mathematics developed first into a 
infatuation, and then into a obsession. And that, I am afraid, is where economics lost at least some of its scientific 
moorings – moorings we have yet to regain… [Mathematics] is, of course, both a high and exceedingly difficult 
form of thought and an indispensable tool for every science… But mathematics seems entirely too self-referential, 
too deductive, one might almost say too pure to be considered a science. Let me dwell on these three words – self-
referential, deductive, and pure – for they describe where economics has gone wrong, in my view.(Blinder, 1999, 
pp. 146-7). 
 
In our view, the theoretical shortcomings we have seen in the previous section are 
closely linked to methodological and ontological presuppositions mostly held by mainstream 
economists. The problem concerns to something that Dow (1990) calls ‘Cartesian mode of 
thought’ and Lawson (1997, pp. 17-18) calls ‘deductivism’. In short, this mode of thought sees 
                                                 
7 For a sad report on how the failures of economist’s models of efficient markets and dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium is being received by their supporters, see Cassidy (2010) and Cohen (2009). Some mainstream 
economists are simply loosing their temper. In a reply to Krugman (2009), Cochrane (2009) defends his own 
stance as follows: “Imagine this weren’t economics for a moment. Imagine this were a respected scientist turned 
popular writer, who says, most basically, that everything everyone has done in his field since the mid 1960s is a 
complete waste of time. Everything that fills its academic journals, is taught in its PhD programs, presented at its 
conferences, summarized in its graduate textbooks, and rewarded with the accolades a profession can bestow, 
including multiple Nobel prizes, is totally wrong. Instead, he calls for a return to the eternal verities of a rather 
convoluted book written in the 1930s, as taught to our author in his undergraduate introductory courses. If a 
scientist, he might be a global-warming skeptic, an AIDS-HIV disbeliever, a stalwart that maybe continents don’t 
move after all, or that smoking isn’t that bad for you really.” 
theories only as logically derived series of propositions8. Moreover, those propositions are 
interpreted as entities apt for formalization. The next short step is supposing that, since logical 
structures have truth value intersubjectively demonstrable, they are the only valid and sound 
theorizing in any science, economics included. And since formal structures are contentless9, this 
presupposition also amounts (even unwillingly) to sacrifice relevance for rigor, elegance and 
precision for practical implications. But, if there is a problem with formalism in economics, 
what exactly is the problem? How could we come to such a state? Can we do any better? 
To begin with, formalism is a complex term, interwoven with mathematization, 
axiomatization and model-building. Following Chick (1998, p. 1860) – who in turn follows  
Woo (1986, p. 20, n. 1) – our focus will be on axiomatization and model-building as forms – 
syntactical and semantical, respectively – of formalism. Chick, once again, helps to understand 
each of them: 
The axiomatic approach and less rigorous mathematical models have a certain symmetry. In the first, one starts 
with “self-evident” axioms, applies the deductive method using agreed rules of logic and, providing one’s logic is 
correct, arrives at demonstrable truths. Mathematical modelling is more relaxed and less ambitious: assumptions 
need not be “self-evident”; thus there is some scope for the theorist’s judgment, and that judgment may be 
questioned (the “realism of assumptions” debate). In both cases, transformations are then made following agreed 
rules, and the conclusions follow as long as the rules have been obeyed. This procedural homology allows one to 
order one’s thoughts into points about the issue of the appropriate starting point of analysis, precision, and the 
biases inherent in conventional models.(Chick, 1998, p. 161). 
 
This passage has many points that are worthwhile to note. Axiomatics and model-
building both require an appropriate translation of empirical objects of interest into their formal 
counterparts. This is made by the modeller “judgment”10. Models apparently also meet their 
user’s anxiety for “precision” and “certainty”, giving logical consistency to reasoning based on 
a model. They are used also to promote agreement on a given issue, by supposing that it is 
correctly described in the model. But note that benefit is gained only at the syntactical level; 
models are also inherently interpretative, semantical, such that their elements are debatable, and 
their assumptions can be questioned. So, the problem with formalism, in economics or 
elsewhere, is misunderstanding that precision and consistency are completely different from 
validity, let alone practical implications – and giving to the formers ultimate worth. 
This is enough to point out that models are valuable and important, but must be carefully 
used. Dow (2008) gives examples of how the ‘framing’ of a question in a formal model can 
                                                 
8 This characterization is more apt in Dow’s case than Lawson’s, as it is doubtful whether mainstream economic 
methodology is empiricist or axiomatic (see Viskovatoff, 1998). Lawson’s account of deductivism is in terms of 
Popper-Hempel hypothetical-deductive model of explanation which is (while mainstream is not) empiricist. 
9 “While there are different formalist programmes, the unifying principle is self-contained rule-following, by which 
to construct formal languages and deductive systems that are independent of content.”(Chick, 1998, p. 1859). 
10 The mathematician Christian Henning is in full accordance: ‘Mathematical modelling always requires the 
interpretation of elements of the formal mathematical domain in terms of (personal or social, non-mathematical) 
reality. There is no formal way to check whether such interpretations are ‘true’, and the mathematical truth of 
theorems applied to such models does not warrant claims of ‘objective truth’ concerning the modelled reality.’ 
(Henning, 2010, p. 46) 
hinder further understanding of, or worse distorting the object of inquiry. Models of asset-
pricing supposing equilibrium ‘as the end-state of market processes’ (p. 17) are a case in point; 
another is ‘new’ behavioural economics: ‘While there is reference in behavioural economics to 
social framing, as in the conditioning of choice by social norms, there is little exploration of 
how it arises, although sociology might well have provided insights. Because of the axiomatic 
focus on atomic individuals, the influence of society is limited to the introduction of social 
norms as exogenous constraints on rational individual behaviour, without explanation for the 
emergence of these norms or the reasons that rational individuals accept them.’ (p. 19) In a 
similar vein, Blaug (2002, p. 35) asserts that, despite using higher techniques, ‘it is difficult to 
see how the new economic geography illuminates the locational aspects of economic activity 
any better than the old economic geography.’ 
Several commentators find Milton Friedman’s 1953 essay on ‘The Methodology of 
Positive Economics’ the prime source of formalism in economics11, nevertheless statements in 
contrary in this very piece (Friedman 1953, pp. 10, 11-12), in other places (Friedman, 1999, p. 
137), and the most pronounced influence of others, like von Newman, Morgenstern, Arrow and 
Debreu (Blaug 2002, p. 27; 2003).12 
Take the following, rightly considered the most important (and controversial) 
methodological statement of the essay: ‘In so far as a theory can be said to have “assumptions” 
at all, and in so far as their “realism” can be judged independently of the validity of predictions, 
the relation between the significance of a theory and the “realism” of its “assumptions” is 
almost the opposite of that suggested by the view under criticism. Truly important and 
significant hypotheses will be found to have “assumptions” that are wildly inaccurate 
descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more 
unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense). The reason is simple. A hypothesis is important if it 
“explains” much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass 
of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits 
valid predictions on the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must be 
descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many 
other attendant circumstances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the 
phenomena to be explained.’ (Friedman, 1953, pp. 14-15, our italics) A footnote attached to this 
passage, reads: ‘The converse of the proposition does not of course hold: assumptions that are 
unrealistic (in this sense) do not guarantee a significant theory’. 
                                                 
11 See Chick (1998, p. 1865), Blaug (2002, p. 30), Lawson (2009, p. 766), Hodgson (2009, p. 1216), Dow (2008, p. 
17), and especially Hands (2009). 
12 Backhouse and Medema (2009, p. 486) find also an influence of Lionel Robbins on the path towards 
formalization, once his definition of economics as allocation of scarce resources was seen by mathematical 
economists (mostly associated to the Cowles Commission) as easier (than Marshall’s?) to formalize. 
Why Friedman is so important to the formalization of economics? Based on this only 
passage, almost every writer finds Friedman ‘licensing’ the free use of unrealistic assumptions 
while constructing economic models. In the context of global financial crisis, his fingerprints 
are found in sanctioning models which contain assumptions of substantive rationality, efficient 
markets, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, and so on. No matter what did Friedman 
thinks on economic theory and practice. His essay cried louder. A supporter of Friedman 
methodological statements evaluated its far-reaching consequences this way: ‘working 
economists look for heuristics that orient them in the fruitful direction and also make them feel 
that their work is scientific. When seeking fruitful heuristics, coherence and philosophical 
sophistication are not necessarily the dominant considerations. Crude, intuitive notions may be 
perfectly adequate to point an economist in the right direction.’ (Mayer, 1993, p. 214; our 
italics) Interestingly, in spite of so much ink spent with his essay, Friedman never disavowed 
any comment, whether in support or in attack of it13. Thus, the way was freed for economists to 
pursue any kind of assumption, no matter how ‘wildly inaccurate’ it may be.14 
At this point is important to note the Hands (2009, p. 158) in fact denies any 
responsibility of Friedman-the-man for formalism in economics. And he points to his just 
mentioned warns against excessively ‘tautological’ methods of analysis. However this does not 
mean that economists, when they need to make their methodological allegiances explicit, refuse 
to take comfort in Friedman’s essay and feel themselves good scientists. We think they do, 
indeed. 
Of course, methodological strictures do not run in a vacuum. Hodgson (2009, pp. 1215-
1216), for example, provides a range of socio-cultural factors accounting for the winning of 
formalism, like the changing system of university teaching and research – towards more and 
more specialization and quantification, the downplaying of ‘big questions’ concerning society 
                                                 
13 A conference celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Friedman’s essay was organized by the Erasmus Institute of 
Philosophy and Economics in 2003. In the published book of this conference, Milton Friedman was invited to 
write the ‘Final Word’ in 2004. Here is Mäki’s (2009, p. xviii) comment: “To my knowledge, this is the first time 
that he has publicly spelled out his views about what others have written about his essay, but unsurprisingly 
perhaps, he keeps his statement very general and polite (while in private correspondence and conversations, he has 
been active in reacting to various criticisms and suggestions in more substantive ways). He had decided to stick to 
his old private rule according to which he will let the essay live its own life. It remains a challenge to the rest of us 
to live our academic lives together with the methodological essay that he left behind.” 
14 Moreover, when Friedman (1953, p. 8) delimitates the domain of validity of theories according to his 
methodology, any theory/hypothesis is made unassailable: “Viewed as a body of substantive hypotheses, theory is 
to be judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to ‘explain’.” Lawson (1992, 
pp. 154-156, 158 note 6) takes this “class of phenomena” to mean posited conditions of closure, thereby stable 
conjunction of events can be obtained. In a similar vein, Mongin (1987, p. 86, n. 16) asserts that being so vaguely 
stated, this domain of applicability “corresponds, in a circular reasoning, to simply exclude the known falsifiers of 
that theory.” It would be a short step to treating economics as a kind of intellectual game played for its own sake. 
All in all, we find that much of this explain the alluring of Friedman’s essay for working economists – a rhetorical 
success gained at the expense of methodological coherence. Limitations of space prevents a detailed 
methodological treatment of these issues, but see Nagel (1963); Brunner (1969); Musgrave (1981); Caldwell 
(1982, chap. 8) Mäki (1986, 1992b); and Lawson (1992) for specialized critiques of Friedman. 
and the ultimate aims of scientific endeavor, and the ‘publish-or-perish’ pressure. Outside 
universities, market individualism and the cult of (quantifiable) performance has had been in 
line with these developments. 
But one should not imply, from the critique of formalism sketched above, an utter 
rejection of mathematical methods in economics. A more tempered stance was recommended 
by Dow (1995, pp. 723-724) drawing on Keynes’s remarks on the use of mathematics in 
economics. The key point is Keynes’s turning the focus away from the dichotomy use/do not 
use, to situations in which mathematical modelling is appropriate. These conditions can be 
briefly stated: (i) when the assumption of constant structure is reasonable for the subject at 
hand; (ii) when the object of theorising does not include significant non-quantifiable elements; 
(iii) when variables are commensurable. There is also conditions for using formal reasoning, 
independent of quantification: (iv) that the structure being analysed can reasonably be 
represented as constant, such that the variables can be represented as independent, or, if not 
constant, that interdependence can be expressed deterministically; (v) that all relevant factors 
can in practice be expressed formally. The danger with giving priority to mathematisation is 
that the range of relevance is limited to those factors which can, given current capabilities, be 
expressed formally; and (vi) that the internal logic of the mathematical model is sufficient for 
persuasion. That is, the words employed in presenting mathematical argument themselves carry 
moral authority. Summing up, the more constant the structure of interest and the more it can be 
expressed formally, the more confident can one be of properly using formal models. 
However, this does not exhaust the possible uses of formal models15. Henning (2010, 
pp. 44-45) gives a lists the following ones: (1) to improve mutual understanding; (2) to support 
agreement; (3) to reduce complexity; (4) for prediction; (5) to support decision; (6) to explore 
different (quantifiable) scenarios; (7) to explore the implications of the model; (8) to guide 
observations and support learning; (9) to lend beauty and elegance to theories. It is apparent that 
Keynes’s concerns regard the purposes (4)-(6), whereas the method of idealization (Mäki, 
1992a; Nowak, 1989) regards purpose (3), and ‘conceptual exploration’ (Hausman, 1992, p. 
221) regards purposes (7)-(9). Purposes (1) and (2) are uncontroversial16. 
Sugden (2002) offers a different view of models. Analyzing Schelling’s segregation 
model and Akerlof’s “market for lemons”, he notes that these models do not fit in any of above 
conditions or uses. Akerlof’s model, for example, does not predicts the price for almost new 
cars. Nor Schelling’s model predicts any behaviour of racial discrimination in industrial cities. 
Thus, they are not concerned with prediction or control. Sugden assents that this model can be 
                                                 
15 There is an increasing literature on models, their relation to reality and their construction. Here we can only 
redirect the interested reader to it. See the papers included in the Part III of Mäki (2002), in Morgan and Morrison 
(1999) and in a rather recent issue of Erkenntnis (January 2009). 
16 Suppes (1968) argues for the use of formalism in science, but considers only purposes (1)-(4) and (7). 
interpreted as ‘conceptual exploration’, but that is not all about them. They are constructed as 
counter-examples, counterfactuals, to shed light in some unperceived stretch of reality, to be 
likely to explain real world phenomena. Models do this job caricaturing, exaggerating, 
deforming some feature, isolating some putative causal factor, but keeping correspondence with 
reality (pp. 114-117). 
This interpretation accepts Mäki’s (1992a, p. 335; 2005) vision of models as (idealized) 
“thought experiments” but, in Sugden’s (2002, p. 121) words: 
if a thought experiment is to tell us anything about the real world (rather than merely about the structure of our 
own thoughts), our reasoning must in some way replicate the workings of the world. For example, think how a 
structural engineer might use a theoretical model to test the strength of a new design. This kind of modelling is 
possible in engineering because the theory which describes the general properties of the relevant class of structures 
is already known, even though its implications for the new structure are not. Provided the predictions of the 
general theory are true, the engineer’s thought experiment replicates a physical experiment that could have been 
carried out. On this interpretation, then, a model explains reality by virtue of the truth of the assumptions that it 
makes about the causal factors it has isolated. 
 
Therefore, models are devices to think about real world phenomena; its validity depends 
on what we know about the real word and if the workings of causal factors cohere with it. 
Models are deductive devices and we fill the gap between model world and real word by 
making inductive inferences from the world of model to the real world. 
If a model is genuinely to tell us something, however limited, about the real world, it cannot be just a description 
of a self-contained imaginary world. And yet theoretical models in economics often are descriptions of self-
contained and imaginary worlds. These worlds have not been formed merely by abstracting key features from the 
real world; in important respects, they have been constructed by their authors.(Sugden, 2002, p. 133). 
 
In sum, it seems that there are good reasons to require realisticism of models. Although 
no model is, perfectly realistic (‘whole-the-truth’), our acceptance of them depends on their 
realistically picture the workings of some isolated causal factor (‘nothing but the truth’). That 
is, they must correspond to what we do know about the real world. Would be a leap of faith to 
suppose that models which are unrealistic in both senses could, nevertheless, illuminate 
phenomena of the world we live in. However, they could function as heuristic devices or might 
be serviceable for ‘conceptual explorations’. This point leads us back to the issue of identifying 
real causal factors in a hidden, intransitive layer of reality – which we deal by discussing the 
possible ways to follow. 
 
4.3. Proposing alternative modes of thought in the aftermath of the crisis 
 
Since formalism is a process which exhibit, according to Hodgon, path-dependency and 
positive feedbacks, would be naïve to expect its instant abandoning. Yet, while some authors, 
like Colander et al. (2009), Keen (2009), Kirman (2009), or even Blaug (2002) propose a way 
out through looking for better, more empirically-driven models (e.g. complexity theory, 
experimental and behavioural economics), Lawson considers any adjust in the economist’s 
toolkit unhelpful. 
[I]t is clear that the recent crisis situation (like almost any social situation) is something that needs to be understood 
rather than modelled… [I]t seems overly heroic to suppose that in order to capture the sorts of developments that 
occurred, all that is required of modern academic economics is a different type of mathematics, or internal 
‘theoretical’ adjustments like the treating of a model’s still isolated atoms as heterogeneous or as forming 
independent expectations; or focusing on the possibility of multiplicity and evolution of equilibria; or hoping that 
cointegrated vector autoregression (VAR) models will uncover robust structures within a set of data, and so 
forth… [I]t is apparent that the legitimate and feasible goal of economic analysis is not to attempt to 
mathematically model and perhaps thereby predict crises and such like, but to understand the ever emerging 
relational structures and mechanisms that render them more or less feasible or likely. Amongst other things, this 
requires an account of the background conditions against which ongoing developments are taking place. In the 
current context, this includes understanding how the credit expansion triggered by liberalised financial markets set 
the conditions for the current situation, and the assortment of developments and mechanisms by which it has come 
about (Lawson, 2009, pp. 774-775). 
 
From the previous two sections it is easy to see why Lawson takes such a stark position. 
Mathematical modelling amounts to suppose an ontology of closed systems. Reality, as we see 
it is, in contrary, an open system. Therefore, formalism is ex definitione inappropriate for 
studying processes in the real world. As others (e.g., Hodgson, 2006; Chick and Dow, 2005; 
Mearman, 2002) have pointed out, Lawson runs in difficult here. Recall that we leave an open 
question above: how to identify causal factors hidden in the deep layer of reality? Lawson’s 
(1997, chap. 15) answer is: by examining contrastive pattern of events or demi-regularities 
(equivalent to Nicholas Kaldor’s stylized facts). Such events are ‘rough and ready’, not strict, 
semi regularities, etc. Thus, an example from Lawson himself will help to understand the point 
and its problem. Take the pattern of productivity growth in the British manufacturing sector in 
the twentieth century. It is inferior to (otherwise similar) advanced countries. That is a 
contrastive demi-regularity. We can abduct a cause to it in a non-empirical domain (e.g. the 
British system of labour relations), and we can corroborate or revise it with further research, 
always giving prime concern to the ontology of the object. 
This is a research conducted in an open system? No, because it isolated as negligible, or 
temporarily ‘out of focus’, many other facts as worth of being considered ‘causes’ as the 
isolated one. Thus, demi-regularities are partial closures, and for two reasons: (i) it is 
impossible to take all the relevant facts at once; theorizing is necessarily to discriminate and 
therefore to exclude some aspects of reality from our model world; and (ii) as Chick and Dow 
(2005) argue at length, the distinction between open and closed systems is not just on/off, as 
Lawson has lead us to belief, but is more nuanced. They identify eight conditions for a system 
to be open and other eight conditions to be closed. It requires satisfying any one of the former 
to be open, but all of the latter to be closed. Moreover, ‘complete openness is incompatible with 
a system remaining recognizable as a system.’ (p. 367) So is important to be in mind that when 
Lawson insist on the pointlessness of modelling work, we would assuming he is reflecting 
Keynes’s concerns on mathematical modelling, which concern mostly with stability of, and 
prediction upon (quantifiable) data. Closeness is often partial and this feature provides scope to 
discuss meanings, aims, and assumptions of that work, including its ontological commitments. 
The problem, as we see it, is not the use of models per se, but what are the elements, the 
method and the judgment made in its design. 
But it does not mean that we are enthusiast of the new assortment of modelling 
techniques, such as complexity theory, behavioural economics, evolutionary game theory, and 
so on. Along similar lines of Lawson’s critique (see the previous quotation) of Colander et al. 
(2010), also Hodgson (2009) and Dow (2008) cast doubts on these new techniques. And for a 
fundamental reason: it is a mirage, a Sisyphean task, to look for models that ‘fit’ better the data 
of recent financial turmoil. Mathematical modelling is inherently unhelpful to deal with stuff 
that makes for strong uncertainty, such as innovation, inexistent information and animal spirits. 
New modellers seem to let this uncomfortable feature pass in oblivion. Yet, we have already 
paid a high price for placing prediction above understanding. 
If our assessment is valid, there is strengths and weakness in both positions. So, could 
we do better? Our answer would be in line with two pluralist statements. Twenty-five years 
ago, the sociologist Etzioni (1985, p. 390) proposed “a medical model” for economics, which 
consists in making use of ‘findings from a variety of basic sciences’, including sociology, 
political science, environmental science, psychology, etc. aiming at transcend the rational 
economic man, but ‘without reverting to a much less analytical science, to the way [nineteenth 
century] political economy was’. Similarly, Chick (1998, p. 1868) says: ‘I hope that I have 
argued persuasively that the role of formalism is to be precise and rigorous where that is 
possible, and that other modes of analysis exist as valid and valuable complements. Formalism 
is fine, but it must know its place’. This way, we hope, it will be possible transforming 
economics into a more realistic and useful science. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
The recent financial crisis gives an opportunity for reflection on the foundations of 
economic theory and the practices resting upon it. Despite some factors which could have been 
avoided – such as excessive reliance on the self-correction properties of markets, on rating 
agencies, and on the self-regulation capacity of market participants, on excessive freedom, even 
the cult, of market, seen as guardian of growth and entrepreneurship, and the damaging effects 
of believing in normalcy of self-seeking behaviour – we think this episode brings with it deeper 
lessons. 
At the practical level, that of norms, regulations and operation of markets, there is a 
need for growth and changes in regulation and in incentives for many of the most important 
market players (Volcker, 2008; Stiglitz, 2009). We described the roots of the crisis and the real 
causes which finally started it. We also presented a quite detailed explanation of the four major 
issues, nor mutually exclusives which brought about the crisis, following Krugman and Wells 
(2010): a) low interest rates, mainly by the Federal Reserve among many others Central Banks, 
after the 2001 recession; b) the so-called global savings glut; c) the disguise of risk by financial 
institutions, rating agencies and models used by these major actors; and d) government 
programs which would have created moral hazard. 
At the theoretical level, our paper echoes a host of non-orthodox economists who urge 
for a change in the foundations of economic theory (Dymski, 2010). The dominance of the New 
Keynesian thought, and its twin conceptions of (systemic) equilibrium and (representative 
agent) substantive rationality (alas, conceptions ‘imported’ from New Classical economics), are 
dangerously fragile and even damaging in episodes of crisis. How can one explain the volatility 
of asset prices, once one assumes that markets are in continuous equilibrium through time, in a 
random process? Moreover, how can one sustain that this macro equilibrium emerges from 
optimizing decisions of agents with perfect knowledge, not only about economic fundamentals, 
but even about the dynamics of markets, such that they do not commit systematic errors? In 
other words, these perplexities clearly point out that this model is overly unrealistic in the sense 
defined in this paper, namely, that a model validity depends on what we know about real 
economic systems, rather than on dogmas of competitive (and thus efficient) markets. 
Orthodox economists certainly would explain the crisis by failures in models of 
evaluation of risks and in predictions provided by them. They would blame governments for 
their ubiquitous failures. They would also complain that bailouts can jeopardize public belief in 
market systems (or even in ‘free societies’) by hindering market discipline (i.e. bankruptcy). 
They will keep on seeking more sophisticated models to provide previsions “fitting” better the 
data. And they will keep on preaching about the virtues of markets and the sinfulness of 
regulators (Acemoglu, 2009). From these quarters one should have low expectations of 
transforming economics because of what Keen (2009) calls ‘inertia of the immovable object of 
the economic belief’. Thus, the orthodox lessons from the crisis oscillate between recitation of 
old sermons and marketing of new techniques. We shall not discuss – we not even dare – how 
changes in the scientific community’s beliefs take place. But economic methodology can be 
helpful to assess arguments for change the economist toolkit. 
The economists from who we have drawn upon in this paper hold converging views that 
failures of orthodox economic theories can be tracked down to methodological 
misunderstandings, though methodology is seldom explicitly discussed by those theories. And 
that is why the influence of Friedman’s essay plays such an important role in our argument. 
Despite the perception of Friedman as a foe by formalist revolutionaries, or Friedman’s 
admonitions on the importance of empirical testing of theories, ‘once the assumption do not 
matter, the cat was out of the methodological bag, the profession was free to go speeding down 
the formalist road’(Hands 2009, pp. 150-1). Assumptions of DSGE, efficient markets, 
representative agents, etc. simply do not matter, only its empirical predictive implications. 
During the booms, reality seems to authorize this kind of presumption. Moreover, ‘it is all very 
well to have economic theory dominated by a school of thought with an innate faith in the 
stability of markets when those markets are forever gaining – whether by growth in the physical 
economy, or via rising prices in the asset markets. In those circumstances, [heterodox] 
academic economists can rail about the logical inconsistencies in mainstream economics all 
they want: they will be, and were, ignored by government, the business community, and most 
of the public, because their concerns don’t appear to matter.’(Keen, 2009, p. 2) 
The methodological approach endorsed here, that of critical realism, puts forthright 
emphasis on the importance of considering the ontology of objects under scientific economic 
investigation. It argues for considering the nature of objects of interest for economists, like 
households, firms, markets, production, distribution, trade, money, etc., as they really are in the 
world we live in, rather than as they could be in an idealized world model. Mäki (1992a) could 
make an objection to that claim, since by defending realisticness we are, in fact, restraining our 
view to ‘common-sense realism’ (as opposite to ‘scientific realism’ which contains non-
observable entities). However, as we have seen, economists of different persuasions would 
claim that a model credibility is not divorced from what we know about the real word, the 
world existing out of the model. 
This approach is sceptical about the capability of new formal models to solve the 
theoretical problems we are faced, even though their ontological compromises are richer than 
the orthodox ones. And that is so because: (i) a theory have to be translated into a formal 
language to be a model. In such a translation problems are “stripped out” of most of its non-
formalisable aspects; and (ii) creativity and surprise cannot be modelled. It is clear enough that 
computer simulations, for example, depend on the instructions on how to ascribe/change 
probability distributions over results, according to rules defined from the programmer. Thus, 
although they are important and superior to overly simplified worlds of neoclassical models, 
those models hardly can improve our knowledge of social and economic reality where decision-
taking under uncertainty is part of the ontology. Yet those methods need not be abandoned. 
They can provide heuristic frames for better theories, function as pedagogical devices and in 
some cases give insights on counterfactuals (Sugden, 2002). But they really must be very 
carefully handled. And they are very limited tools for prediction, as Keynes said long ago. That 
is, in our view, the point of many warnings from Hodgson and Lawson. 
At last, it seems that the depth and length of the crisis was not enough to force 
economists to take this warnings seriously, paradoxically as a consequence of the very 
heterodox policies. Anyway, economic theory has nothing to lose in taking ontological and 
methodological issues seriously. It is past time to shake off the old prejudice of Lord Kelvin, 
and embrace less formalism in doing economics. If this path is not chosen, the dismal science 
may lose by persisting in their ‘physics envy’ and cyclical recantations when some ‘past 
masters’ are rescued from the dustbin. That is to say, by not doing that a large part of 
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